This financial crisis will uproot the unchanged hungarian political elite of the past 30 years. The pillars of their past stability, the myth of our convergence to The West and the taboo of their criminal untouchability have been shaken and that gives real chance for change. All of these people cannot be chased away, some of them might be, but what is more important: the rules the hungarian political elite is based on can be changed. There is need for a government serious about change and there is a need for an intellectual base filling the catchy goals of change with meaning. A chance like this only comes once every quarter of a century: now or never.
The calm before the storm
Even a half year ago things seemed stable: the pensions were rising, welfare funds were being spilt, the ones who could cheat cheated, the ones who could not took loans so they could lie a middle class existence for themselves. Noone liked the system, the tax fraud, the bad schools or the morally bankrupt police, but everyone managed. It seemed that the divergence of the country [from the West] could continue freely with no effect to the halfbaked hungarian elite and their positions. First and foremost this was guaranteed by the fact that on the top of the system there throned unwaveringly the creator, the maintainer, the controller of the system and the final guarantee of the lack of change : the hungarian political elite.
This group is composed of politicians, leading bureaucrats, influential editors and experts. For all their differences one thing connects them: they have remained on the level of the half-knowledge of the eighties and because of that, in some cases inadvertently, became the maintainer of the rules of the elite, the "likethis". It wasn't necessarily unavoidable for these people to form such a strong bond though. This knowledge and rules at first were the properties of the communist regime's technocrat elite. The newcomers instead of transcending all this, became acclimatized step-by-step. This process has been strengthened by many things, from the lack of self-confidence through the old reflexes of the sucking up neophytes to the lack of international outlook. Whatever the reason, the facts are the facts: only a minority of them can be seen to have came from somewhere else. It is no miracle that even half a year ago it seemed that the "likethis" remains with us for good and deconstructing it is only possible on the very long term.
Lightning strikes
Then the lightning has struck. From one day to the next the money was gone. The foreign creditors were reluctant to lend a single penny and on our own we would have been incapable of settling the country's debts. The majority of the hungarian political elite embarrassingly avoids the phrase best describing the current situation: the bankruptcy of the state. They think uttering this phrase would cause panic and thus worsen the situation. Hiding behind the curtains of responsible behaviour, their real goal is to avoid facing the issue, because this bankruptcy is the consequence of their actions.
The loan provided last year by the IMF was to prevent the collapse. It is not often heard in Hungary that we had to run to the IMF first in the world, even before Pakistan and Ukraine. Not because we were the most unlucky ones, but because our huge national debt we wouldn't have lasted another month without further loans. Let's not forget, the rest of the countries in the Visegrad group do not need the IMF's help. We have caused our problems, not the rest of the world.
The IMF loan was only sufficient enough as to avoid the total catastrophe, at least so far. This didn't prevent the hungarian economy from entering a free-fall. There might be some who remember the two stringent years after the Bokros austerity measures, at that time the GDP growth was 1% a year. This year it is likely that our GDP will fall by 4%. In 2009 it is very likely that in everyone's extended family there will be someone knocked out by the crisis: one loses his job, another is forced to live on welfare, yet another is forced into shark loans and many people will default on their home and car loans. In the optimistic case hundreds of thousands of people will see their livelihoods crumbling.
This will, even in Hungary, call for people being hold responsible. 2010 will, not only very deservedly bury the Gyurcsány government, but it will make the whole halfbaked political establishment crumble.
The magical stability of the hungarian political elite
The hungarian political elite was impossibly stable. Slightly exaggerating, it could be said that only biology managed to make personnel changes in the group. Even in the in-fighting of the eighties' Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party one could not really fail: the losers could remain inside the inner circle. What is much more important however, is that opposed to the rest of the countries in the region, in Hungary the fall of the iron curtain didn't bring serious upheaval. Even though the top leadership of the country has been replaced, in other parts of the political elite, in the polity of the state, in the political media and among the influential experts there has been no change. What's more come 1994, the seemingly permanent change in the political leadership became a thing of the past. The continuity is illustrated perfectly by the fact that among the Visegrad group countries only in Hungary could the old state party remain a leading political party, the old state newspaper the largest poltical newspaper and it is considered impolite to call the leaders of the old communist regime, communists.
The magical stability was not only true in their case or in connection with the change of the form of state, but during the transformation in countries in the broader region outrage and discontent created by the corruption lead to earthshattering upheaval in the political elite. The upsurge of the anti-establishment forces that were strengthened by the abuses (Dzurinda in Slovakia, 1998; Kaczynsky in Poland, 2005; Borisov in Bulgaria, lately) caused a significant portion of the former elite to disappear from politics and those that remained were forced to adapt their ways of operation. Here in Hungary only corruption was present, without upheaval. Noone disturbed the peaceful sleep of the establisment.
The hungarian political elite could remain continously legitimate for the past 30 years. When someone had a serious problem with those in power, then the alternative dear to him/her was found within the very same elite. The legitimacy of this power was upheld by a myth and a taboo. These were born in the eighties and through gentle nurturing, the hungarian society followed and believed them.
Pillars of stability: the myth...
The myth is no other that slowly but surely we're getting closer to the western standard of living. According to the myth, even though lots of things are not working properly, there isn't a fundamental problem because the reforms (in the eighties), the market economy (in the nineties) or the EU membership (lately) slowly and with bumps, lead us in the good direction. Noone is really satisfied with the present state, but everyone hopes it will be slightly better sooner or later. We are convinced that our politicians are bad, but no so bad as to prevent the country from moving forward.
Even though in the past 30 years the country was diverging from the western standard of living (see the World Bank's data on purchasing power parity relative to the GDP) the hungarian political elite successfully upheld the myth that we really are converging. The hungarian state overreaching itself, based on loans, spent huge sums so that no well organized voting block would permanently retain a losing position. The pensioners, teachers, public servants, young mothers or former miners all received enough state funds to allow them to retain hope. According to a hungarian social research institute's revelative findings the political elite assured the peaceful transition during the fall of the iron curtain by easily accessible age concessions and disability status for pensions. For the overwhelming majority, even in the hardest times hope remained that things will become better even if at the cost of tightening the belts at times. The loan bought myth upheld the legitimacy of the political elite.
...and the taboo
The political elite's lack of criminal liability and untouchability is the big taboo of hungarian politics for the past thirty years. Everyone knew it existed, but noone really talked about it publicly.
In the eighties the above-the-law nature of the nomenclature followed directly from the logic of the system. Sadly this is one of the things that didn't change with the fall of the previous system. It is not a coincidence that solely in Hungary among the Visegrad group countries not a single former leader was held responsible for the crimes committed by or during the communist system. The message was clear: the political elite is free to do anything. So clear, that noone forgot about it. Not those in the circle, not those outside the circle, neither those in the judicial branch. While members of the political elite built large mansions from couple hundred thousand Forints [=a few thousand euros] of salary and though their henchmen acquired large stakes in certain companies, noone was ever charged with any wrongdoings. If the rumours emanating from police stations can be believed, then it seems to be the case that policemen are burying investigations rapidly when politically potent people come into view. With these cases, not even that they don't get to be cases in the courts, but it is very rare for media headlines to call attention to them.
Everyone knows that it's better to be silent: while the political elite's base legitimacy was stable the dissenters were easily extracted from the mass.
The price of stability
The direct price of this stability was the deeply indebted nature of the country. In a country that is falling behind only the money of others can prop up the illusion of safety. The hungarian state in the past thirty years amassed approximately eight thousand billion Forints of debt. Yes, the lion's share of responsibility belongs to the Hungarian Socialist Party and it's former self the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, but apart from a few commendable examples dissenting voices couldn't be heard from the rest of the political elite - politicians, experts, journalists - either when Péter Medgyessy and then later Ferenc Gyurcsány started spending the country's money in a way that would put sailors on leave to shame.
Due to the stability bought at the money of others, there wasn't pressure on the political elite to face their own and the elite's (in the broadest sense) halfbaked knowledge. A structure was conserved for decades that was only supposed to remedy the semi-market, semi-democratic and semi-western problems of the system of the eighties.
The end of stability
The stability has ended however. Both the myth and the taboo is going to be crumbling in the next one or two years and the dusk of the halfbaked political elite begins.
The financial crisis will shake the myth of our false convergence to the west. It won't take half a year for a lot of people to experience what it means to have a 4% recession or a 330-1 HUF-EUR exchange rate. Until next year hundreds of thousands of people's livelyhood will collapse and the hungarian government not only won't be able to help, but it won't even be able to provide hope for those people. It will suddently become apparent that we're in a dead-end and terribly many people will began to yearn for something fundamentally new - new rules, new goals, new symbols and people authenticating these new authorities. The current political elite will end up where, judged by it's performance, should have ended up ages ago.
Even now, there are cracks appearing in the wall of the taboo. It is not clear why, but in 2008 the in-fighting among the political elite led to a window into the inner view. Through the case against Zuschlag we have received a window into the thinking of one of the strongest groups of the Hungarian Socialist Party, while even the prime minister was forced to testify in court. During the "monitoring case" the public became privy to the phone conversations of the richest enterprenour in Hungary. These cases would have been unimaginable before. The election campaign, the two small parties' struggle for survival and the in-fighting in the loser party of the 2010 election will no doubt further enable this situation. What's more, the hungarian media tastes blood in the water when it became apparent during 2008 that of almost everyone things can be freely written about and that spells the end of the former self-censorship.
The once in a quarter of a century chance
The crumbling legitimacy of the old guard allows the traditionally conflict avoiding hungarian society to be made ready for comprehensive change. It is a once in a quarter of a century chance that is coming along right now to steer the country on a rising path.
It is entirely sure that the solution doesn't rest in a new party or buying an existing one. In an unchanged atmosphere these parties would produce the same problems (and in fact, they already did) that the current ones are being burdened with. Instead, taking advantage of the feeling of defeat and hopelessness caused by the crisis, the currently existing structures have to be cleaned out and filled with new meaning and new authority.
Before the permanent losers and pessimists would envision an impossible task again, let me mention a few relevant international examples. In 1981 when Ronald Reagan became president, the United States was in the financial crisis of the last 50 years and the elite was pondering about the inevitable decline of the country. America back then was lead by the liberal establishment that has quite visibly run out of ideas by that time, being in charge for the past 40 years. The change spearheaded by Reagan wholly uprooted the american political elite in the next eight years without an establishment of a new party or castrating the polity of the state. What happened is that president Reagan divorced himself spectacularly from the old ideas and brought the non-liberal political scientists sitting on the sidelines into the mainstream. Building on the success of the president the patterns of thought had changed that converted first the broad elite and then the whole country.
Reagan is far from the only example, Margaret Thatcher followed a similar route at the time of what was thought to be an inevitable decline of her country by taking seriously the advice of thinkers preaching liberal economy. She promised and brought fundamental change while making one of the established parties an engine for change and in less than a decade has fundamentally changed the british poltics and even the country. Or let's mention the Carl Bildt led Moderate Party in Sweden, that after nine years of being in opposition inherited the biggest crisis after World War 2 from the social democrats, so that by defying the socialist dogmatism that enchanted the elite not only the economy, but swedish politics and society were fundamentally changed. It is first and foremost their achievement that in the past decade Sweden has become a model country.
Success like these need only two things: political will and the intellectual backbone to fill it with real knowledge. It is a question for the future whether the political forces forming a government in 2010 have the will to play by the new rules, to leave behind the "eternal" truths of the eighties and to start approaching things from the side of performance instead of the side of intentions and to create a culture of responsibility.
It is clear that whoever gets to be in charge on the sinking ship, his fundamental interest is to uproot the current situation since the best way to escape from the crumbling legitimacy of the current political elite would be the way forward: to spectacularly depart from the discredited past and to arise as a champion of change. Everyone will appear to do so, but the question is who is credible enough to be believed, who has the capacity for change. In this respect, some amount of compromise seems unavoidable since the next election won't bring the competition of new leaders either.
It is not enough to placate the flags with a few new words however, in order for change to happen there needs to be new meaning. Elections can be won by 5 second soundbites, but they are not enough to cause real change. For the latter a real, credible alternative has to be created based on facts and reasoning. Only these details can give enough pointers to the state and political middle-management implementing these policies on a daily basis, aswell as to the supporters wishing to publicly or in small communities to support change. Without this depth, the "reform" can only fail.
The good news is that in the matter of substance, we're much better off than we were two years ago. The lack of ideas and walking in circles prevalent in the political establishment (with a few exceptions deserving praise) has generated serious movement outside the establishment. A generation has appeared on the fringes of public life that has grown up and has collected experience at respectable companies, foreign universities or at the amber-embedded hungarian workshops. What's more, the internet destroyed the political elite's communications monopoly and so fresh thoughts and alternative suggestions receive attention much easily.
Success, of course isn't guaranteed. It involves a hard push from below, lots of meaningful political decisions and of course luck to place this country again on a different track. It's not about bringing paradise to Earth, but about stopping this country from lagging more and more behind. This chance is so attractive that it's not only possible but compulsory to play for a win.
The next year
2009 can be a precursor to change. It is possible to direct public attention towards the important things aswell: the questions why is our problem so fundamental and what are the paths leading towards a solution.
People need to be made aware how fundamentally mistaken the political elite's rules and thesises are and that it wasn't blind misfortune that lead us here but a long line of wrong decisions. The naked kings of the political elite and the apologists of "likethis" stuck in the eighties and nineties need to be confronted. It has to be promoted how things could be done better.
Some have already been doing this and they've done a lot so that we can even talk about a serious chance of changing things, however now we need even more reasonable voices and opinions based on hard facts. Those people who would not normally take sides in this issue are needed aswell, since there needs to be a core momentum in order to get things going and exert influence on the public and the political parties, to make it clear: the country needs fundamental change in 2010.
Many would prefer not to discuss this topic. They would gladly argue about anything but this. The defining media institutions of "likethis" will pour the topics about the hungarian-gypsy issue, the fascists, the unpatriotic people and about the Gyurcsány-Orbán duel on us. This challenge should not be met though, the fight needs to be decided on our own terms.
This is not 1989 anymore. We are more numerous, we know more and we want what we want more. This time we need to come through.
(Translation of the original article at http://index.hu/velemeny/jegyzet/feltud090127/ - for those foreigners who want to know what is going on in Hungary)
